NAVIGATING THE CULTURAL MALAISE:
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
GEORGE O. WHITE III1
I. Introduction
China is considered to be one of the oldest living civilizations on earth. Until
the twentieth century, and for essentially five thousand years, feudal lords and kings
ruled China. However, since 1979, under Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy, the
Chinese economy and legal structure have developed rapidly. China’s domestic
markets and potential purchasing power is all but measureless. Most economists
suggest that China has the third largest economy in the world, has unfathomable
potential, and is predicted by many to be the most powerful economy by the middle
of the twenty-first century. Even prior to being accepted into the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”), China had attracted a considerable amount of foreign direct
investment (“FDI”). Foreign investors are eager to do business and invest in
projects in China, but many are not sure about the proper methods for dispute
resolution if a deal goes bad. While the overwhelming majority of FDI projects in
China are successful, inevitably projects go sour, and they will need to be resolved in
the best interests of all parties.
Problems such as government expropriation;2 lack of transparency and
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Expropriation is “to take possession of, especially for public use by the right of eminent domain,
thus divesting the title of the private owner . . . to dispossess of ownership.” WEBSTER’S NEW
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 683 (3rd ed. 1996). Chinese law forbids nationalization of
2
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obscurity of the law; reliance on a non-public operational code, rather than publicly
accessible regulations;3 administrative and political control in the form of
uncoordinated laws and policies at different levels of the Chinese bureaucracy;4
inconsistent interpretations of the law;5 inadequate fiduciary duty rules for joint
venture partners;6 and profit restrictions on investments,7 to name just a few,8 are still
major concerns that foreign investors should be keenly aware of when investing in
China. Recent turmoil in Beijing regarding McDonald’s serves as a good example:

FDI ventures, including joint ventures, equity joint ventures and wholly foreign owned enterprises.
However, there are special circumstances when this would be allowed, including “national security
considerations and obstacles to large civil engineering projects. . . . There have been no cases of
outright expropriation of [FDI] since China opened to the outside in 1979.” Id. But, if there were,
and they could be proved, Chinese law allows for compensation of expropriated foreign investments,
but has not defined what the actual terms of compensation would be. See id. See Folsom, at 761-64
(detailing anti-expropriation laws in The Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (1986)).
See Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of Protection and Predictability?, 34
VA. J. INT’L L. 615, 622 (1994). “The conflict between the Chinese and Western approaches to the
law is not helped by the Chinese practice of citing unpublished laws. . . . Under the Western notion of
law, this practice clashes head on with due process. . . .” Id.
3

See Anna M. Han, China’s Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In A Transitional Economy, 5 PAC. RIM. L.
& POL’Y J. 457, 489 (1996) (stating that “[d]espite provisions in the Chinese Constitution to the
contrary, the confusing and often overlapping lines of authority remains a problematic issue facing
China’s enterprises.”). See Daniel C.K. Chow, The Limited Partnership Joint Venture Model In The People’s
Republic Of China, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 39 (1998).

4

5

See Han, supra note 3, at 491-92.

6

See Chow, supra note 3, at 38.
Current Chinese law does not appear to have an equivalent concept to fiduciary
duty. While this means that all non-control groups are exposed to the risks
associated with the lack of such duty, the local partner in the type of foreigncontrolled joint venture . . . is particularly vulnerable because of the amount of
control vested in the foreign investor. This lack of general protection most clearly
exposes the non-control group to risks where the control group seeks to
intentionally exploit the non-control group.

See Henry J. Graham, Foreign Investment Laws of China and the United States: A Comparative Study, 5 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 253, 277 (1996).
7

8 Another problem is the concept of requiring “foreign operators . . . [to] generate at least half their
sales volume from Chinese-made goods.” See id.
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Beijing recently ordered McDonald’s to vacate its prize location in a
shopping district near Tiananmen Square. The American fast-food
chain not only has its largest restaurant on the site, as a commitment
to the Chinese market, but also signed a twenty–year lease . . . . They
[McDonald’s] have been ordered off the property to make way for a
development project. . . . As a result, McDonald’s, one of China’s
earliest investors, is reviewing its China investment strategy.
[Meanwhile] [o]ther possible investors, like Ford Motor Company,
remain on the sidelines.9
Undoubtedly, this example creates an environment of “business disenchantment”
regarding the Chinese investment market.10
Before foreign investors enter the Chinese market, they should consider
many unique Chinese cultural and legal concepts. Only with time will a foreign firm
begin to understand the Chinese relational conditions and business environment.11
Therefore, the longer the foreign enterprise functions in China, the more competent
and efficient it will become at navigating the Chinese bureaucratic malaise and at
avoiding problematic situations.12 This improved competency and efficiency ranges
from understanding basic concepts of Chinese culture to understanding how to
handle arbitration or, if necessary, litigation issues.

9

Id. But see, id. at 268-69.
One bright shining example for the world and the rest of China to behold is
Guangdong province, the mainland alter ego of its vibrant neighbor, Hong Kong.
Guangdong is blazing the path for the rest of China providing regulations
governing . . . joint ventures and the transfer of land-use rights . . . [W]estern legal
concepts have taken hold in Shenzhen [as well], courtesy of Hong Kong. . . .
Whether China can emulate Guangdong’s success and adaptability remains to be
seen.

See id. While such uncertainty may not bode well for the near-term investment, the Chinese
government is hastily trying to create a much improved investor environment. See Part III.

10

11 See Rajib N. Sanyal & Turgut Guvenli, American Firms In China: Issues In Managing Operations, 9
MULTINATIONAL BUS. REV., Oct. 1, 2001, at 41.
12

See id.
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II. FDI Cultural and Dispute Resolution Considerations
1) Chinese Culture and Business Relationships: How These Factors Affect FDI
Negotiations
Understanding Chinese culture is vital to understanding how to effectively
negotiate in and out of business deals in China. Unknowledgeable foreigners are
often baffled by the way Chinese attorneys and businessmen cultivate long lasting
relationships and negotiate business transactions. Thus, before negotiating a project
or venture in China, a few concepts must be understood by potential foreign
investors and their attorneys.
A) Face
Saving face is by far the most important concept in Chinese society. Face is a
Confucian13 concept meaning “prestige” and “personal character.”14 A loss of face
can be extremely detrimental to one’s ability to adequately negotiate a deal. Direct
and confrontational behavior is an inherent part of most foreign legal and business
systems.15 However, “Chinese negotiators consider direct and confrontational
behavior as rude, offensive and losing face.”16 Thus, many Chinese are particularly
sensitive and will quickly take offense to any remarks that could cause them to lose
face. Therefore, when negotiating with Chinese counterparts, foreign investors and
their attorneys must understand the concept of face during negotiations, or else
cultural confusions could lead to greater frustrations, ultimately undermining the
investment or venture opportunity.
B) Guanxi
Guanxi is another very important idea of Chinese culture that will inevitably
play a major role in business and legal relationships and negotiations in China. In
13
See DUN J. LI, THE AGELESS CHINESE 340 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 3d. ed. 1978) (1965)
(explaining that Confucius was born in 551 B.C. and died in 479 B.C. . . . and taught the virtue of Li,
which are the concepts of “propriety, ceremony, ritual, rite, mannerism, etiquette, etc.”).

Bee Chen Goh, Trade And Investment Negotiation With The Chinese, in CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS: TRADE AND INVESTMENT 39 (K C D M Wilde ed., LBC Information Services 2000).
14

15

Such as the United States legal system.

16

Goh, supra note 13, at 39-40.
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essence, guanxi is a principle that dictates the way parties relate to each other in
business transactions.17 Guanxi is “a special relationship individuals have with each
other in which each can make unlimited demands on the other.”18 Most business
and professional relationships tend to begin and develop by way of guanxi
connections.19 “What is uniquely Chinese is the fact the moral sense of obligation is
so overwhelming that one normally has to comply with requests, unless the request
itself is impossible, or outside one’s means to perform it.”20 If a refusal of a guanxibased request occurs, then the requesting party will lose face.21 Furthermore, the
value of “good” guanxi cannot be overemphasized; it is extremely important in
Chinese society.22
C) Patience, Flexibility, and Compromise
In Chinese society, the idea of reasonableness is considered a constant of
everyday life.23 Yet, the idea of reasonable contract terms is not the same as in most
western common law systems.24 Generally, Chinese contract negotiations are broadly
based, and “seek general principles,” rather than detailed rules explicitly built into the
contract.25 For example:
[t]he Chinese step back from an actual agreement and begin
negotiations by presenting a letter of understanding that outlines
general principles. U.S. managers are often put off because they want
to get to details. They’re not averse to the rhetoric of the preambles,
17

See id. See also Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 10, at 42.

18

Goh, supra note 13, at 39-40.

19

See id.

20

Id.

21

See supra Part IV.1.A.

22

See Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 10, at 43.

This is called “chian tao li,” meaning the reasonable way. See Goh, supra note 13, at 40. This
concept started during the time of Confucius; it is a Confucian precept. See supra note 12.
23

24

See generally Goh, supra note 13, at 40.

25

See id.

60

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 5

but they want to build a relationship on facts. For their part, the
Chinese stress friendly introductions as a way of establishing their
relationship.26
Therefore, the Chinese do not place priority on contractual specificities, but on
“other social precepts such as mutual benefit, social harmony and long-term
objectives as their guiding principles in observing the spirit of the transaction.”27
This concept is deeply embedded in Chinese societal history and culture through the
teachings and writings of great philosophers such as Confucius (including
Neo-Confucian philosophies)28 in the Analects,29 Sun Tzu’s Art of War,30 The Book of
Changes (the I Ching),31 the Tao-te Ching (Book of Taoist Virtue),32 and the Book of
Mencius.33 Therefore, the Chinese place a premium on an agreement that enables
“both parties to act flexibly and reasonably and to make compromises as the
26

Id.

Id. See, e.g., ERIC LEE, COMMERCIAL DISPUTES SETTLEMENT IN CHINA 1-4 (Lloyd’s of London
Press 1985) (explaining the “Confucian virtue of compromise”).

27

28 See LI, supra note 12, at 229-34 (explaining that the emergence of Neo-Confucianism came about
by the increasing popularity of Buddhism and Taoism during the T’ang Dynasty). One of the primary
figures promoting Neo-Confucianism was Chu Hsi (1130-1200), regarded by many to be one of the
greatest Chinese philosophers of all time. Id. at 228. Neo-Confucianism is the Chinese philosophy
that developed the concept of Yin and Yang. Id. at 232. See supra note 26. See generally PETER
HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 17-42
(Hong Kong University Press 1997) (e.g., providing informative insight into the Confucian value
system and its affect on social order in China).

The Analects (circa 479) was a book of Confucius’ sayings compiled by his disciples shortly after his
death. See CORNE, supra note 27, at 71. The basic premise behind this extremely important Chinese
philosophy is man’s relationship to man, relatives, their gods, ancestors, and the state. Id. at 76-77.

29

See generally, Sun Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 27-30 (Thomas Cleary trans., Shambhala Publications, Inc.
1st ed. 1988) (establishing that the book was based on sayings by a great military leader, Sun Tzu,
during the Warring States period (403-221 B.C.) of the Chou dynasty).
30

31 See Li, supra note 12, at 81. Deals predominantly with the supernatural, and was claimed by both
Confucians and Taoists as part of their tradition.

See id. at 327. The primary book of the Taoist belief system and philosophy, which was founded
by Lao-tzu in the 6th century B.C. See id. at 84-85. This was a philosophy based on the ideas of fate
and the idea of “nothingness;” that nothing is what it really seems to be. Id. at 85-86.
32

See id. at 77-78. Book written by the great Confucian philosopher Mencius (372-289 B.C.), which
stresses man’s inherent good nature.
33
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situation so requires while at the same time abiding by the actual objectives of the
dealings themselves.”34 In essence, the Chinese handle contracts by establishing a
very general contract, which can then be amended at various times to allow the
parties greater maneuverability.35 While this may seem rather frightening to the
foreigner, it is business as usual to the Chinese.
The foreign investor36 must also learn to be patient. Patience is truly a virtue
in China, not to mention in almost every other country in Asia. “[T]o do successful
business in China you need large reservoirs . . . [of] patience . . .patience . . . [and]
patience.”37 The Chinese consider patience a valued asset, thus Chinese negotiators
take a very leisurely approach when negotiating investment contracts and ventures.38
Furthermore, the Chinese place strong emphasis on “poise, reason, and
self-control[;]”39 impatient and negative behavior is heavily frowned on.40
2) The Consultation Process – The Culturally Preferred Method Of Dispute Resolution
Most foreign investors generally consult with lawyers before and during the
process of FDI negotiations. However, the Chinese do not normally consult with
lawyers because such consultation would infer a mistrust of the parties involved in
the negotiations.41 In fact, lawyers are normally only brought in after the FDI
contract has already been negotiated.42 Thus, when a problem with the agreement
arises, or when a problem arises during the life of the investment or venture, the
34

Goh, supra note 13, at 41.

35

See id.

“Wei-gorin” in Mandarin Chinese. See generally JOHN DEFRANCIS, BEGINNING CHINESE (Yale
University Press 2nd ed. 1976) (1964).

36

37

Goh, supra note 13, at 42.

38

See id.

39

Id.

40

See generally id.

41

See Graham, supra note 6, at 254.

42

See id.
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Chinese always prefer to settle the dispute by amiable consultation.43
Consultation is the preferred way to solve disputes, “and has been the main
method for settling disputes for thousands of years.”44 Most Chinese FDI regulative
devices stipulate that if a dispute arises, the parties should try to settle the dispute
through consultation.45 Although China is a member of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) and has ratified the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the
“New York Convention”), the Chinese place a strong emphasis on resolving disputes
through informal consultation. Furthermore, consultation is the most natural form
of dispute resolution for Chinese enterprises, primarily because “Chinese culture and
attitudes … favor [ ] harmony and good relationships between people [and
enterprises] and . . . most Chinese . . . would prefer a compromise reached by
themselves to a decision imposed by another.”46 At its core, this exemplifies the true
spirit of the Chinese; control.
Consultation47 is simply an attempt to discuss, negotiate, and resolve a
dispute between the parties.48 Consultation is an informal method of voluntary and
friendly discussion between the parties.49 While Chinese regulations and laws do not
See Zhang Yuqing, Like Bamboo Shoots After a Rain: Exploiting the Chinese Law and New Regulations on
Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures, 8 N.W. J. INTL. L. & BUS. 59, 97 (1987).

43

44 Gary J. Dernelle, Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s Republic of China, 6
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 331, 357 (1994). See generally Part IV.1.C. See also Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 10,
at 43 (inferring that starting with this process will help build good relations with the local
governments and businesses involved). Studies have suggested that the better the foreign enterprise
communicates with the Chinese government, the easier it is to maneuver within the Chinese system.
See, e.g., id. at 42.

See Dernelle, supra note 43, at 358. See also Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 10, at 43 (asserting that
“the firm in solving various operational problems . . . reaffrims that positive government cooperation
can help foreign firms address specific operational problems that they may face”). Obviously, the
longer the foreign enterprise has operated in China, the smoother things will operate. See generally, id.
45

46

Kui Hua Wang, CHINESE COMMERCIAL LAW §9.2.2, at 280 (1st ed., 2000).

47

“Xieshang” in Chinese. See DEFRANCIS, supra note 35.

48

See LEE, supra note 26, at 9-10.

See John S. Mo, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in INTRODUCTION
Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., Sweet & Maxwell Asia 1997).

49

TO

CHINESE LAW 368 (Wang
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directly explain how to conduct the consultation process,50 both parties must first
agree to “consult each other to determine the rights and liabilities and to obtain the
truth from facts.”51 Informal consultation starts at any agreed time and ends once
the parties have either achieved their goals or abandoned the consultation process.52
This is not a method of “compromise through concession and apportionment of
liabilities.”53 While consultation is premised on the idea of fairness and “fullyinformed voluntariness,” parties can take advantage of each other or make certain
unfair concessions.54 For an agreement to be binding, both parties to the
consultation must be happy with the final result.55 “A dissatisfied party may renege
on the agreement and resort to other means of settlement such as arbitration or
litigation.”56 Furthermore, while it is a rather ad hoc process and can be abused by the
more powerful and influential of the parties, consultation serves as a very good
starting point to resolve disputes between both foreign and Chinese parties in FDI
disputes.
3) The Mediation Process – The Favored Back-up To Consultation
While consultation is the preferred method for resolving FDI disputes in
China, mediation58 is by far the second most preferred method, and is generally
57

50

See id.

51

LEE, supra note 26, at 10.

52

Id. at 10-11.

53

Id. at 10.

54

See Mo, supra note 48, at 368-69.

55

Id. at 369.

56

Id.

57

See International Trade Administration, supra note 1. See also Yuqing, supra note 42, at 97.

In China, mediation and conciliation are synonomous with one another. Here, to avoid confusion,
mediation will be used for ease of understanding and reading. [Mediation/conciliation is] a consensus
based dispute resolution process in which the parties to a dispute meet with a third party [the
mediator] to discuss mutually acceptable options for resolution of the dispute. The [mediator] has
some input into the resolution of the dispute in the sense that the [mediator] encourages the parties
to consider options for resolution, which are fair in all circumstances. Wang, supra note 45, §9.3.1 at
282.

58
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considered to be part of the same process as consultation.59 Like consultation, the
origins of mediation are “deeply rooted” in Confucian philosophy, which strongly
discourages social conflict due to its possible obstruction with the natural order of
life and other intrinsic disharmonious principles.60 Even under the rule of Mao
Zedong’s long lasting Communist regime, mediation was a powerful tool for
applying social, political, and economic pressures on problematic enterprises and
individuals.61 In fact, under Chairman Mao, the Communist party used mediation to
consolidate its power-base, thereby instituting its policies as way of social control.62
Today mediation is a favored option for dispute resolution by the Chinese
government because it embodies certain Communist tenets, such as “communal
obligations” and “rejects formal judicial mechanisms which [have] traditionally been
characterized as pre-revolutionary institutions for class manipulation.”63 Hence, the
link between mediation, consultation, Confucian philosophy, and the Communist
ideology is deeply embedded in China’s modern business practices and the FDI
negotiation structure.64
Mediation is considered by most Chinese officials to be the ‘“first line of
defense’ against the deterioration of ‘disputes between friends,’”65 which could result
as a dispute between enemies, as often occurs in other forms of dispute resolution,
most notably litigation. Mediation is a “pre-arbitration or pre-litigation”66 process.
59

Id.

60

See Parts IV.A-C. See also Lee, supra note 26, at 11.

See Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan, Mediation and Conciliation, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 86 (Ralph H. Folsom & W. Davis Folsom eds.,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996).
61

62 See Lee, supra note 26, at 11 (stating that “In February 1954, with the promulgation of the
Provisional General Rules Concerning the Organization of the People’s [Mediation] Committees,
hundreds of People’s Committees were set up throughout the country.”). These rules “consolidated
the work of the people with regard to conciliation and placed the conciliation machinery on a proper
footing.” Id. at 11-12.
63

Id.

64

See id.

65

Id. See generally Folsom & Minan, supra note 60, at 86-113.

66

See Lee, supra note 26, at 12.
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Therefore, when the consultation process is unsuccessful or inappropriate for the
particular FDI dispute, either party involved may request mediation.67 Considering
the alternatives, especially the potentially hazardous and opaque process of
litigation,68 mediation is the safest method for a foreign investor to protect its interest
in expensive, and rather valuable, FDI projects or ventures. Furthermore, mediation
is the safest and most cost-effective way to manage a dispute in a country where
“lawyers are scarce . . . discovery procedures are limited . . . courts do not possess
injunctive or contempt powers . . . there is little [ ] liability insurance . . . judges are
under trained . . . [and] there is a tradition of [Communist] party review of judicial
decisions.”69
The actual mediation process is quite informal, as procedural issues will not
arise within the context of the mediation process.70 Essentially, each process is
molded to fit the particular dispute at hand.71 Although numerous commercial
dispute laws have been passed in China,72 the most important legal mechanisms for
commercial or FDI mediation are the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of
China (“China Arbitration Law”),73 the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”) rules,74 and the Rules of the Beijing
Conciliation Centre.75 “[Mediation] has [also] been accepted as a means of dispute
67

See Dernelle, supra note 43, at 358.

68

See Folsom & Minan, supra note 60, at 86-87. See infra Part IV.5.

69

Id. at 86.

70

See Lee, supra note 26, at 12.

71

See Wang, supra note 45, §9.3.1 at 282.

See generally Mo, supra note 48, at 370-81 (detailing all of the various forms of
mediation/conciliation in China).
72

73 See Wang, supra note 45, at 284 n.18 (describing that the China Arbitration Law “was passed by the
Standing Committee of the NPC on 31 August 1994 and became effective on 1 September 1995.
Articles 51 and 52 [ ] deal with [mediation]”).

See Professor Tibor Varady, Class Lecture in International Commercial Arbitration at Emory
University School of Law (Jan. 24, 2002). CIETAC is a very popular Chinese arbitration tribunal
working under a formalized set of international arbitration rules, however, the tribunal does regularly
assist “disputing parties” in mediation proceedings. Id.
74

75

See generally Wang, supra note 45, at 286-89. The Beijing Mediation Centre was set-up in 1987 under
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settlement in Article 128 of the Contract Law [and]. . . Article 14 of the Equity Joint
Ventures Law.”76
Parties must follow a few basic tenets to initiate mediation. For example,
under CIETAC, the following mediation guidelines exist: 1) there must be rules that
both parties are willing to accept;77 2) mediation “is conducted by CIETAC to
ascertain the facts and distinguish right from wrong on questions under dispute;”78 3)
mediation is to lead both parties to a form of compromise;79 4) the parties decide on
the choice of law provisions to be completely recognized and enforceable;80 5)
international practices can be used and are generally honored;81 and 6) if an
agreement cannot be reached or mediation cannot be continued, mediation will be
terminated and “an examination and oral hearings” can take place in accordance with
arbitration rules and standards.82 Mediation can be conducted prior to arbitration
under the CIETAC rules in several ways. Under CIETAC, mediation includes faceto-face discussions, discussions over the telephone, and discussions by mail or email.83 Also, the parties can request that two members of an informal CIETAC
mediation panel speak with each side separately, thus being a conduit for
compromise.84 The parties may also have a sole mediator “pass [ ] compromise
the China Chamber of Commerce. It deals with international commercial mediation and maritime
mediation. The Centre’s headquarters are situated in Beijing. It presently has about 25 local branches
throughout the country and about 250 listed mediators. The Centre was set up in response to
demands for international commercial mediation . . . from the China Chamber of Commerce. Mo,
supra note 48, at 380.
76

Wang, supra note 45, at 284.

77

Id. at 285. These basic mediation tenets were established by CIETAC arbitrator Yanming Huang.

Id.
78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.
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schemes or convey [ ] opinions to the other party.”85 While CIETAC is by far the
most popular forum for mediation, other options, such as administrative mediation
by local or city governments86 or court-conducted mediation, are also available.87
4) Arbitration
If the parties are unable to settle their dispute through negotiation or
mediation, arbitration is naturally the next step in the process.88 Even though the
Chinese prefer negotiation and mediation, arbitration has become, over the last two
decades, a mainstream form of dispute resolution in China and the primary way to
resolve international commercial disputes.89 In fact, “[b]etween 1992 and 1997, the
CIETAC accepted 3,292 international economic and trade cases and resolved 2,793
of them.”90 This is primarily because foreign multinationals establishing investment
85

Id. at 286.

See Mo, supra note 48, at 374-75 (describing that these “organizations have a general power and
obligation to resolve ‘small’ disputes falling within their jurisdiction in order to strengthen social
stability”).

86

See id. at 377-79 (explaining that Chinese courts may initiate a mediation session in most
economic/business cases at any point of the litigation process, if they so desire). See generally Lee,
supra note 47, at 13-14 (explaining that this form of mediation dates back to “the Chinese Resistance
against the Japanese Invasion before the People’s Republic of China was established. A judge, Ma Xiwu, first combined court proceedings with [mediation] in liberated areas”).

87

See LEE, supra note 26, at 15. See generally Fredrick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of
Arbitration in Resolving Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People’s Republic of China, 15 BERK.
J. INT’L. L. 329, 330 (1997) (providing a very thorough discussion on the arbitration process in
China).
88

89

See generally Graham, supra note 6, at 254-55.
Arbitration eventuated, in part, from the Confucian ideal of social harmony and
conciliation. Historically, such self-regulation kept most “private law” disputes out
of the state courts, depending instead on local conciliation [or arbitration] and the
threat of social censure. [Today,] [a]rbitration and other forms of alternative
dispute resolution represent the mainstream in China. [f]urthermore, arbitration
can serve the dual purposes of providing a “face-saving” approach to dispute
resolution while preserving the underlying business relationship benefiting both
sides. [Thus,] [t]he increasing prevalence of long-term contractual relationships in
international business [and investment] underscores the importance of conciliatory
dispute resolution mechanisms.

90

Wang, supra note 45, §9.4.2 at 293.
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projects in China prefer the control and autonomy of this process.91 Many
international investors view this as a way to get around China’s problematic court
system.92 Nonetheless, an arbitration clause in an FDI agreement creates a
contractual obligation to submit any dispute to an impartial tribunal chosen by the
parties.93 Thus, international commercial arbitration, with regard to Chinese FDI
disputes, has very appealing qualities, such as procedural fairness, party autonomy in
choosing the arbitration rules, neutrality, efficiency and cost effectiveness, arbitrator
competence, and binding awards for the parties to enforce.94
CIETAC is the main international commercial arbitration commission in
China. In fact, CIETAC is the “sole organization in the [People’s Republic of
95

See generally Professor Tibor Varady, Class Lecture in International Commercial Arbitration at
Emory University School of Law (Jan. 8, 2002) (discussing that while the fate of the case does lie with
a third party, the proceedings must follow what is provided in the arbitration clause in the FDI
contract). See supra note 88. See Brown & Rogers, supra note 87, at 330 (stating that “the key paradox
is that, while arbitration in China is imperfect, it remains the best alternative for international
investors”).

91

92

See generally infra Part III.

See Brown & Rogers, supra note 87, at 330. See also INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§II.1. (Tibor Varady, John J. Barcelo III, & Arthur T. von Mehren eds., West Group 1999). An
arbitration tribunal from practically any country, due to party autonomy, can be chosen by mutual
agreement of the parties. See id. See also Yuqing, supra note 42, at 97.
93

See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 92, AT §II-§V. See also Professor
Tibor Varady, Class Lecture in International Commercial Arbitration at Emory University School of
Law (Jan. 8, 2002; Jan. 18, 2002; Feb. 19, 2002). See John A. Spanogle, Jr. & Tibor M. Baranski, Jr ,
Chinese Commercial Dispute Resolution Methods: The State Commercial and Industrial Administration Bureau, in
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 129 (Ralph H.
Folsom & W. Davis Folsom eds., Kluwer Law International Ltd 1996). But, investment contracts
often stipulate arbitration in Stockholm because the forum there is considered neutral. Most Chinese
contracts stipulate arbitration by [CIETAC]. During the past year, several western participants and
panel members in CIETAC proceedings raised concerns about the organizations procedures and
effectiveness. In one instance, a highly respected American member of an arbitration panel
threatened to resign from CIETAC over alleged procedural irregularities during consideration [of] a
case [believing] enforcement of arbitral awards [to be] sporadic. Sometimes, even when a foreign
company wins in arbitration, the People’s Intermediate Court in the locality where the foreign venture
is situated may fail to enforce the decision. Even when the courts do attempt to enforce a decision,
local officials often ignore court decisions with impunity. Foreign Investment Laws: Changes, May 2001,
supra note 57.
94

95

See Wang, supra note 5, §9.4.4 at 297.
The CIETAC was established in Beijing. . . . It also has two regional offices, one
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China] authorized to hear non-maritime commercial arbitration cases between
Chinese and foreign parties.”96 The China Chamber of Commerce originally
developed CIETAC’s arbitration rules.97 CIETAC is made up of an official Chinese
administrative body able to exercise its “delegated legislative power under the
Chinese Constitution and the relevant regulations of the State Council.”98 While
arbitration is a complex process,99 CIETAC has jurisdiction to cover matters such as:
international or foreign trade-related disputes, including those related to the Hong
Kong SAR, Macao, or Taiwan regions;100 disputes arising “between enterprises with
foreign investment and disputes between an enterprise with foreign investment and
another Chinese legal person . . . or economic organization;”101 disputes arising from
project financing;102 or certain special cases stipulated in the administrative
regulations of the People’s Republic of China.103

established in Shenzhen . . . and the other in Shanghai[;] . . . the CIETAC has 418
arbitrators on its name list for international economic and trade arbitration.
Among these arbitrators, 25 are citizens of Hong Kong SAR and 112 are
foreigners, of whom eight are Australians.
Id. For an expose on CIETAC, see Paul R. Weber, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission, in CHINA AND HONG KONG IN LEGAL TRANSITION: COMMERCIAL AND
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES 73-75 (Joseph W. Dellapenna & Patrick M. Norton eds., American Bar
Association 2000).
Ge Liu & Alexander Lourie, International Commercial Arbitration in China: History, New Developments,
and Current Practice, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 389 (Ralph H. Folsom & W. Davis Folsom eds., Kluwer Law International 1996).
96

97

See Mo, supra note 48, at 384.

98

Id.

E.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION supra note 92, at §I. See generally Jerome Alan
Cohen, The Role of Arbitration in Economic Co-operation with China, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT,
AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 508-31 (Michael J. Moser ed., Oxford
University Press 2nd ed. 1987).
99

100

See Mo, supra note 48, at 384.

101

Id.

102

See id.

103

See id.
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China ratified the New York Convention in 1986104 with a few reservations.
First, China would only enforce the Convention on the basis of mutual recognition,
thereby refusing to enforce an award in a non-New York Convention country.
Second, the Convention would only apply to disputes recognized under Chinese
law.105 Also, under CIETAC arbitration, an award must be rendered within nine
months from the date when the arbitration tribunal is formed.106 However, if the
parties wanted a quicker and more efficient process, they would simply agree in
writing and apply for the case to be conducted under the Summary Procedure of
CIETAC.107 Thus, an award could be rendered within thirty days if heard orally, or
within ninety days of the formation of the arbitration tribunal if the case is examined
“on the basis of documents only.”108 Finally, and most importantly, all arbitration
pertaining to commercial or investment matters in China is institutional; there is no
ad hoc arbitration.109
5) Litigation – Venturing Into The Undesired World Of Last Resort
The Chinese have a very bad impression of the court process and prefer
more amicable ways of settling disputes, primarily due to being non-confrontational
in nature and not wanting to risk losing face.110 However, over the past few decades,
the Chinese government has established economic court divisions within the legal
framework to handle civil litigation regarding economic and commercial disputes to
curtail “speculation, profiteering, and all kinds of criminal activities.”111 It is
important to note that:
See id. at 392. See, e.g., DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1 (Tibor Varady, John J. Barcelo III, & Arthur T. von Mehren eds., West Group 1999).
104

105

See id. For example, the China Arbitration Law. See supra Part IV.3.

106

See Wang, supra note 45, §9.4.4 at 299.

107

See id.

108

Id.

However, CIETAC does not object to ad hoc arbitration. See id. In fact, “[i]n cooperation
agreements signed between CIETAC and arbitral institutions of other countries, there are provisions
allowing parties to select UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and form an ad hoc arbitration tribunal.” Id.

109

110

See LEE, supra note 26, at 9.

111

Id. at 18.
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[l]itigation of [a] dispute is possible, but is usually a last resort. To
litigate a dispute involving a foreign economic contract in the
Chinese court system, the foreign economic contract must not
include an arbitration clause and a written agreement to arbitrate
must not later be reached. In practice, few foreigners or foreign
countries have litigated their contractual disputes.112
Rule of law is still developing in China.113 The court system is still
predominantly state controlled and opaque in character. Many Chinese court justices
and attorneys have relatively inadequate legal training, compared to western
standards,114 and bias against foreigners in the Chinese court system is
commonplace.115 Foreign litigants face additional problematic factors such as rapidly
changing and volatile laws. Furthermore, Mandarin Chinese, the official Chinese
language, is required in all court proceedings, and foreign parties can only be
represented by Chinese counsel. Collectively, these factors could cause considerable
hardship and uncertainty in the litigation process for a foreign enterprise.116
Therefore, a foreign enterprise doing business in China must have a very good
arbitration clause built into its investment or joint-venture contract, or find an
alternative means for resolving a dispute in a neutral international forum rather than
contend with a Chinese court.117
112

Dernelle, supra note 43, at 358-59. See also Yuqing, supra note 42, at 97.

See Brown & Rogers, supra note 92, at 333. See also Stanley B. Lubman, Sino-American Relations and
China’s Struggle for the Rule of Law, in CHINA AND HONG KONG IN LEGAL TRANSITION: COMMERCIAL
AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES 9-60 (Joseph W. Dellapenna & Patrick M. Norton eds., American Bar
Association 2000) (detailing the significant legal reforms presently underway in the Chinese legal
system).
113

See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM & JOHN H. MINAN, LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
169-241 (Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989).
114

115 See Brown & Rogers, supra note 92, at 333. See generally Zheng Zhaohuang, On the Adjudicatory
Jurisdiction of Chinese Courts over Foreign Investment Disputes, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE
LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 532-45 (Michael J. Moser ed., Oxford University Press
2nd ed. 1987) (discussing the role of Chinese courts in disputes involving foreign investment).
116

See Wang, supra note 45, §1.2.9 at 35-36; §1.2.13 at 45; §9.5 at 306-08.
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See id. at 333-34. See also Graham, supra note 6, at 254-55.

